The Growing 9/11 Drone Army

Army Sees 11,000% Increase in US Army Drone Arsenal Over Last 10 Years Since: New Legislation Paves Way for 30,000 More Above the USA

Brian Romanoff       Nor Cal Truth     Feb 20, 2012

Never let it be said that the military industrial complex does not heavily rely on 9/11 to continue and thrive.

In October of 2001 the US Army had about 54 drones in its arsenal, however that would change soon after the attacks of 9/11. Some numbers are noted by the Scientific American:

The U.S. Army’s drone armada alone has expanded from 54 drones in October 2001, when U.S. combat operations began in Afghanistan, to more than 4,000 drones performing surveillance, reconnaissance and attack missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan (pdf).

There are more than 6,000 of them throughout the U.S. military as a whole, and continued developments promise to make these controversial aircraft—blamed for the deaths of militants as well as citizens—far more intelligent and nimble.

From 54 drones in 2001 to the current 6,000 in-stock, within 10 years of 9/11 the US Army saw a net increase of their drone arsenal by 11,000%.

That was then. This is now:

A new law signed by Obama last week, HR 658,  is set to increase the amount of drones in the skies over the USA.  The Washington Times has this:

The legislation would order the FAA, before the end of the year, to expedite the process through which it authorizes the use of drones by federal, state and local police and other agencies.

Section 332 of the new FAA legislation also orders the agency to develop a system for licensing commercial drone flights as part of the nation’s air traffic control system by 2015.

The provision in the legislation is the fruit of “a huge push by lawmakers and the defense sector to expand the use of drones” in American airspace, she added.

The agency projects that 30,000 drones could be in the nation’s skies by 2020.

Business Insider points out important facts to remember:

This new bill follows up the Army’s January directive to use  drone fleets in the U.S. for training missions and “domestic  operations.”

And both of these initiatives are mandated in the NDAA  (section 1097) that calls for six drone test ranges to be operational within six  months of that bills signing December 31.

The commercial drone market would be worth hundreds of millions more  if the bill passes.

Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and many other ‘Corporate Partners‘ are poised to profit heavily from the legislation. They are the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International or AUVSI, a conglomerate of ‘defense’ companies that essentially lobbied for and drafted HR 658.

Republic Report highlights the fact that AUVSI doubled its lobbying expenses last year:

Why the Planes Were Not Intercepted on 9/11: The Wall Street Lawyer and the Special Ops Hijack Coordinator

by  Kevin Ryan    source: 9/11 Blogger     April 27, 2011

Of the many unanswered questions about the attacks of September 11, one of the most important is: Why were none of the four planes intercepted?  A rough answer is that the failure of the US air defenses can be traced to a number of factors and people.  There were policy changes, facility changes, and personnel changes that had recently been made, and there were highly coincidental military exercises that were occurring on that day.  But some of the most startling facts about the air defense failures have to do with the utter failure of communications between the agencies responsible for protecting the nation.  At the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), two people stood out in this failed chain of communications.  One was a lawyer on his first day in at the job, and another was a Special Operations Commander who was never held responsible for his critical role, or even questioned about it.

The 9/11 Commission wrote in its report that – “On 9/11, the defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).”[1]

According to the Commission, this interaction began with air traffic controllers (ATCs) at the relevant regional FAA control centers, which on 9/11 included Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis.  In the event of a hijacking, these ATCs were expected to “notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters.  Headquarters had a hijack coordinator, who was the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate. “ 

The hijack coordinator would then “contact the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC)” and “the NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance.  If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD’s chain of command [to the interceptor pilots].”[2]

9/11 Timeline Updates on Feb 2: Air National Guard on 9/11, The Many Deaths of Osama bin Laden

source: History Commons – 9/11 Timeline  Mar 5, 2010

After a hiatus of a couple of weeks, dozens of new entries have been published in the 9/11 Timeline over the last few days. The largest chunk of them covers events at the DC Air National Guard, based at Andrews Air Force Base, on the day of the attacks. Initially, officers assumed that the first crash into the WTC was an accident. However, after the second crash, Andrews learned the Secret Service wanted fighters launched. Although the Secret Service then said it didn’t on the phone, pilots started overwriting recent exercise data on their flight disks.

The base’s intelligence officer was unable to get any information on the crisis, but fighters on a training mission learned of the attacks during refuelling around 9:30 a.m., when the Secret Service called and said that it would like some fighters after all. Missiles at the base began to be unpacked, but the commanding officer, Brigadier General David Wherley, wanted orders from a senior official before he would launch and called the Secret Service again.

The first of the fighters returning from training landed at 10:14 a.m., but did not take off again. Wherley discussed the rules of engagement and apparently then wanted to launch planes in response to an aircraft supposedly approaching Washington. One of the returning fighters was dispatched to look for the plane, but, finding nothing, landed again ten minutes later.

AGAIN!! Fighter Jets Scrambled Because of Unruly Airline Passenger

The bullshit-meter just blew up…. I will point out that on 9/11, fighter jets NEVER came for an hour and a half!  According to 9/11 Commission hearing testimony by the Secretary of Transportation at the time Norman Mineta, top officials including Vice President Dick Cheney were aware that another plane was incoming and hostile. -Brian

related story: Fighter Jets Escort Plane After Passenger Becomes Unruly

source: CNN

In the second such incident in three days, fighter jets escorted a diverted commercial flight on Friday after an unruly passenger caused alarm onboard.

The military sent up two F-16s in response to reports of an unruly passenger aboard AirTran Flight 39, the North American Aerospace Defense Command said in a statement.

The passenger had become belligerent and refused to leave the restroom, airline spokesman Tad Hutcheson told CNN on Friday. The passenger appeared to be intoxicated, he said.

Awareness of Military Cell at FAA Headquarters of Events on Day of 9/11

source: 9/11 Blogger

As people who follow the issue closely are aware, there has been some debate over the involvement of a group of military officers stationed at FAA headquarters–generally referred to as the “military cell”–in the events of 9/11. Although I don’t mean to recap the whole debate here, the basic jist is that the 9/11 Commission claimed that the military were unaware of the hijacking of United 93 until a few minutes before it crashed, but what about the military cell–were they too unaware of what was going on?

Yesterday, I was reading through the commission documents we have posted at the 911 Document Archive at Scribd , and I came across a transcript of FAA communications on the day of 9/11. You can find the following at page 59 (approximately 9:45 a.m. – 9:50 a.m.):

MR. : Tactical Net–

MR. : And this is Cleveland Center. Who’s up?

MR. : It is the Command Center with about five or six people listening.

MR. : Okay. Mr. [inaudible], the chief, just asked if we have any military up or not? Are we pursuing that? We’d like to be able to track this guy (United 93) so we know what’s going on, especially when we lose a transponder.

MR. : We have been in contact with the military cell here in the building and they’re working the issue. I’m not sure where they are with—

Obviously, this does not prove that the military cell at the FAA was aware of the hijacking of United 93 (still less that they passed it on to other elements in the military), but a contemporary reference stating their involvement is certainly interesting evidence.